My master's thesis (in Dutch), in which I assess the choice and use of differentiated entry into force from the perspective of the primacy of the legislator, based on empirical research into this phenomenon in the period 1995-2024, can be read here:
Abstract
In the Netherlands, a law must regulate its own entry into force. Under current legislative policy, this is done by delegating to the government the power to determine the date of entry into force of a law by royal decree. The government may also be delegated the power to differentiate this date for each part of the law. In that case, the law allows for differentiated entry into force. In the recent past, this possibility has in some cases led to constitutional tensions when the government has used it to prevent a part of a law introduced by amendment from entering into force. These incidents call for the formulation of a clearer normative framework within which the legislature and the government must operate when allowing and using differentiated entry into force. It is also necessary to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon in legislative practice.
Dutch constitutional law is based on the primacy of the democratically legitimized legislature. In the context of the entry into force of laws, this primacy means that a law that has gone through the constitutional legislative procedure must always enter into force as quickly as possible and in its entirety. This must therefore always be the starting point for regulating the use of differentiated entry into force.
This study elaborates on this premise and formulates four principles for the legislature and government that regulate their role in differentiated entry into force. When deciding whether and, if so, how to allow differentiated entry into force, the legislature must apply the principles of exception, justification, purpose limitation, and precise delimitation. When deciding whether to make use of a delegated power of differentiation, the government must also apply the principles of exception, justification, and purpose limitation, as well as the principle of full entry into force.
This study shows that, in the period from 1995 to 2024, the principles applicable to the legislature and government regarding differentiated entry into force were only implemented to a limited extent. Allowing differentiated entry into force now seems to be the rule rather than the exception, with very broad differentiation powers frequently being delegated. The justification provided by both the legislature and the government is frequently inadequate. The government does exercise some restraint in the use of differentiated entry into force in cases where this is possible, and allows laws to enter into force in their entirety for the most part. At the same time, in the research period, substantive, non-implementation-related reasons contrary to the principle of purpose limitation are expected to have played a role in the government's decision on the entry into force of 54 to 67 laws. This is significantly more than the cases described in the literature to date.
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